Re: <nettime> Ars Technica > Valsorda > I'm throwing in the towel

[Morlock Elloi <morlockelloi@gmail.com>]

There is no "long-term PGP key model".

There is a fallacy of "web of trust" and fallacy of the notion that 
public keys need to be published (maybe because they are named 'public' ?)
PGP works fine for end-to-end security of authenticated parties. There 
are thousands (probably much more, but I'll stick to my samples and 
extrapolation) of cases where previously authenticated parties, personal 
or business partners, exchange their keys via secure side channel, and 
then happily message each other. Most often each party has dedicated key 
pair for just one correspondent. Public keys are never published - on 
the contrary, they are preferably kept secret. Metadata is not shielded 
unless Tor and throw-away accounts are used, but that is another topic. 
In reality there are very few people one person needs strong secrecy 
with, so the existing key management works well (and no, your social 
network "friends" don't count.)
Then we come back to the issue why would one want to have 
unauthenticated encrypted communication, which appears to be touted as 
one and the only use case for PGP (in other words, someone picks 
someone's public key from the public key server and sends encrypted 
message.) It is hard to find actual use case except superficial 
lifestyle choice ("look ma, I'm encrypting!") Public key servers are 
hackable, thugs will sign keys on key signing parties, so one would have 
to be out of her mind to count on authenticity of the key not received 
directly from the target when serious secrecy is required. The other 
argument for PGP, in the early days, was to prevent mass interception 
and casual surveillance. That has been pretty much taken care of by SSL 
and its strains (again, metadata requires additional measures.)
So the whole argument is fake, a red herring, as it dissects the false 
use case.

> that. It's about the long-term PGP key model -- be it secured
> by Web of Trust, fingerprints or Trust on First Use -- and how
> it failed me.
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